Research

Work Under Review

1. ‘Past Benefits Today Keep Extremism Away.’ Autocratic Privileges Withdrawal and the Emergence of Contemporary Extremism: Evidence from Post-WWII Italy

Can autocratic legacies produce successful extremist parties associated with the previous dictatorship? This article examines how material benefits distributed during autocratic rule can shape political extremism in post-transitional societies. It argues that the withdrawal of those privileges following democratic transitions prompts the rise of extremism aligned with the former regime as a strategy to restore the lost benefits. Using a Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design and original historical data from post-WWII Italy, this study demonstrates that the groups most materially advantaged under the regime—the agricultural landowning elites—who lost their benefits following the 1951 land redistribution reform drove the rise of the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI). By opposing reforms and advocating for the old status quo, the MSI emerged as a vehicle for recovering these lost privileges. These findings reveal how material benefits granted by dictatorships continue to shape patterns of contemporary extremism.

2. When Indoctrination Fails: Autocratic Benefits and the Limited Effects of Indoctrination after Democratization
(with Jan Rovny)

Can autocratic indoctrination shape contemporary democratic preferences? A growing body of research links indoctrination to diminished democratic support after transitions to democracy. However, a central challenge is isolating the impact of indoctrination from other features of authoritarian rule, such as the provision of regime benefits. To overcome this, we leverage a natural experiment in the Baltic states, where the abrupt imposition of Soviet education in 1944 created quasi-random exposure to school-based indoctrination. We compare individuals who completed school before and after this reform, and further distinguish between those who benefited materially–via technical secondary schooling that led to symbolically elevated and materially rewarded employment in state-owned industries–and those who pursued other secondary education tracks. We demonstrate that indoctrination is persuasive only when reinforced by lived experience, particularly through material gains. Where ideological messages are contradicted by tangible personal experience, their influence vanishes.

3. Who Gets to Democratize? How Selective International Pressure Shapes Democratization Outcomes

Are some autocracies more likely to be pressured by the international community toward democratization than others? And are those regimes more likely to democratize as a result? Leveraging a two-step staggered Difference-in-Differences design and data on U.S. democratization pressure toward 135 autocracies, this article demonstrates that such pressure is not only selectively applied, but that this selectivity has real consequences for the democratization prospects of autocracies. Autocracies with economic clout—defined as the asymmetric trade dependence in which democratic states rely more on the autocracy—are less likely to be targeted with democratization pressure following “trigger events”, such as mass protests. Economic clout deters trade partners from exerting democratization pressure in order to maintain the favorable economic status quo that allows them to benefit from trade with the autocracy, thus avoiding extra costs. These findings contribute to understanding why some autocracies transition to democracy while others persist.

Book Project (2025)

Book Manuscript based on doctoral dissertation:
“Autocratic Legacies and Immunisation Against Extremism: A Rational Choice Approach”

In preparation for publication as academic book in 2025.

Working Papers

• “Autocratic Legacies and Party Success: A Material Benefits Approach”
  Part of Dissertation Book project.

• “Material Autocratic Support and Rethinking Democratic Transitions” (with David Doyle)
  
• “Legacies of Redistribution and the Emergence of Political Polarisation”

Book Chapter

• Azevedo Alves, André, and Catarina Leão. “Controlo Democrático do Orçamento.” In Orçamento, Economia e Democracia: Uma Proposta de Arquitectura Institicional, edited by Abel Mateus, 271-296. Lisbon: Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, 2018.

Publication

• Leão, Catarina, “About Tradition in Karl Popper: Does a Popperian Open Society require a grounding in a Shared Tradition?”, Nova Cidadania, Spring 2014, no. 52.